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This paper discusses our methodology for formal analysis and automatic verification of
software programs. It is applicable to a large subset of the C programming language that
includes pointer arithmetic and bounded recursion. We consider reachability properties,
in particular whether certain assertions or basic blocks are reachable in the source code,
or whether certain standard property violations can occur. We perform this analysis via
a translation to a Boolean circuit representation based on modeling basic blocks. The
program is then analyzed by a back-end SAT-based bounded model checker, where each
unrolling is mapped to one step in a block-wise execution of the program.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) Use of basic block-based
unrollings with SAT-based bounded model checking of software programs. This allows
us to take advantage of SAT-based learning inherent to the best performing bounded
model checkers. (2) Various heuristics customized for models automatically generated
from software, allowing a more efficient SAT-based analysis. (3) A prototype tool called
F-Soft has been implemented using our methodology.
We present experimental results based on multiple case studies including a C-based
implementation of a network protocol, and compare the performance gains using the
proposed heuristics.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Model checking is an automatic technique for the verification of concurrent systems. It has several advantages over
simulation, testing, and deductive reasoning, and has been used successfully in practice to verify complex sequential circuit
designs and communication protocols [15]. In particular, model checking is automatic, and, if the design contains an error,
model checking produces a counterexample, i.e., a witness of the offending behavior of the system that can be used for
effective debugging of the system. The procedure normally uses an exhaustive search of the state-space of the considered
system to determine whether a specification is true or false. A brief overview of model checking techniques is provided in
Section 2.
While model checking of hardware designs and protocols has been extensively studied, its application to software
verification had been limited to the use of specialized modeling languages to capture program semantics. The capability
of directly model checking source code programs written in popular programming languages, such as C/C++ and Java,
is relatively new [67]. The general approach is to extract suitable verification models from the given source code
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programs, on which back-end model checking techniques are applied to perform verification. Given the popularity of these
languages, and the increasing costs of software development, verifying programs directly written in these languages is very
attractive in principle. However, there are many challenging issues — handling of integers/floating point data variables,
pointers, recursion and function/procedure calls, concurrency, object-oriented features such as classes, dynamic objects,
and polymorphism. Different choices can be made in modeling these features in terms of accuracy, resulting in various
trade-offs. Some of these are described for C programs in Section 3.
The overall focus is usually on reducing the size of the resulting verification models, by use of appropriate abstractions,
in order to manage verification complexity. The two important measures to keep in mind are: soundness, i.e. any property
proved true is indeed true (no false positives); and completeness, i.e. any property that is true can be proved true (no false
negatives). Typically, modeling and abstraction techniques may sacrifice completeness in practice (even if guaranteed in
principle) due to loss of precision in the abstract models. Furthermore, much useful high-level information may be lost
during the translation from programs to a verification model. Therefore, several software model checkers make a special
effort to exploit high-level information such as control flow and procedure/function boundaries, both during translation to
and during analysis of the verification models. Such use of high-level information in back-end model checkers is described
in Section 5.
In terms of abstraction techniques, predicate abstraction has emerged to be a popular technique for extracting verification
models from software [4,20,22,30]. Predicate abstraction is used to abstract out data, by keeping track of predicates which
capture relationships between data variables in the program. In the abstract model, each predicate is represented by a
Boolean variable, while the original data variables are eliminated. In this way, predicate abstraction allows translation of
a given concrete model to an abstract model, which simulates the concrete model but is usually much smaller. Due to
conservative abstraction, the abstract model has many more behaviors than the concrete model. Therefore, correctness
of a property on the abstract model guarantees correctness on the original concrete model. However, a property shown
to be false on the abstract model needs further investigation. In particular, an abstract model may contain the so-called
spurious counterexamples, that do not correspond to any feasible counterexample in the concrete model. Such spurious
counterexamples can be eliminated by generating a refinement of the abstraction. This process of abstraction and refinement
can be iterated until the property is either proved correct on the abstract model (thereby guaranteeing that it is also correct
on the concrete model) or disproved (by demonstrating existence of a real counterexample on the concrete model). Such
techniques are similar to counterexample-guided abstraction refinement [14,46] demonstrated for hardware designs.
1.1. F-Soft
In this paper, we describe our overall methodology for the analysis of software programs.We have developed a prototype
software model checking tool called F-Soft [40], which has been used primarily for verification of sequential C programs.
It considers reachability properties for verification, in particular whether certain labeled statements are reachable in the
program. It also includes automatic checkers for a set of standard programming bugs such as array bound violations, NULL
pointer dereferences, use of uninitialized variables, memory leaks, improper use of C string library functions, lock/unlock
violations, division by zero, etc. These checkers are implemented by automatically adding property monitors to the given
source code programs. Verification is performed via a translation of the given C program to a finite state circuit model,
derived automatically by considering the control and data flow of the program (under the assumptions of bounded data and
bounded recursion). Optionally, predicate abstraction is supported by a fully automated abstraction refinement framework.
The back-end model checking is performed by a tool called VeriSol (based on DiVer) [26], which includes several state-of-
the-art symbolic model checking techniques. F-Soft also contains a multitude of static program analysis engines [60,61]
to find easy proofs and simplify the model of the program as much as possible before invoking the model checker on the
simplified model and the remaining properties.
A salient feature of our approach for software verification is the central role played by a basic block (sequence of non-
branching statements). From themodeling of software, the abstraction of the source code, to the verification of the generated
software model using an unrolling based on basic blocks — the basic block modeling approach is integral to the proposed
method.
A key contribution of this paper is to use the program counter variable to track progress of the allowed executions of the
code during SAT-based BMC. Effectively, an unrolling during BMC is understood to be one step in a block-wise execution of
the program. In this context each atomic step of the BMC consists of a basic block rather than individual statements. This is
an efficient way of performing BMC, since for each basic block there are only a limited number of possible successors. Given
a single initial basic block, there are thus only a limited number of possible next blocks reachable in new unrollings. Thus,
although each unrolling introduces all basic blocks into the satisfiability problem, many basic blocks in the new unrolling
can be declared unreachable by merely considering the control flow of the software program. This intuition can be used to
prune the search space considerably.
1.2. Related work
The most closely related work to ours is the CBMC tool [16,45], which also translates a C program into a Boolean
representation to be analyzed by a back-end SAT-based BMC. However, there are many differences in our approaches. One
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major difference is that we generate a Boolean model of the software that can be analyzed by both SAT-based bounded
and unbounded model checking, and model checking using BDDs. Another major difference is the block-based approach,
rather than a statement-based approach. Other related work describes usage of basic blocks for predicate abstraction of C
programs [17]. Additionally, CBMC requires a full inlining of functions with no recursion and unwinding of the source code
through a user-supplied constant. This allows the SAT-solver to consider only loop-free paths which is often fast for small
pieces of code with no or few loops. However, this method of inlining and unwinding loops is clearly not scalable to larger
pieces of code or to code with reactive behavior. Our translation method does not require multiple inlining or unwinding of
loops, and can handle bounded recursion.
We also differentiate our approach through the use of pre-processing analyses such as program slicing, range analysis
and invariant analysis using numeric domains. A slice of a program with respect to a set of program elements is a projection
of the program that includes only program elements that might affect the property [13,18,44,66]. Furthermore, we use
range analysis techniques [58,71] to limit the number of bits needed to represent various variables in the Boolean model
compared to using a full bit-width encoding as implemented in CBMC. We also do not need to rewrite the source code to
single assignment form, thus keeping only one copy of each variable. Finally,weuse inter-procedural invariant computations
using the octagon numeric domain [54] to simplify the program before applying model checking [60,61].
We propose new heuristics to exploit many common features of Boolean models generated by our software modeling
approach. We discuss three main heuristics which prune the SAT search space considerably, and the variations we have
used for combining them. Our tool also allows abstraction of the software using localized counterexample-guided predicate
abstraction [41] based on predicate localization [35] and symbolic predicate abstraction techniques [17,47]. In addition,
we use a priori statically computed invariants to discover some relationships cheaply, thereby improving the overall
performance of the predicate abstraction refinement loop [42]. In this paper, we focus the discussion on our software
modeling framework and our improved SAT-solver decision heuristics.
1.3. Overview
Westart by providing a brief backgroundonmodel checking in Section 2. In Section 3wediscuss our block-based software
modeling approach. Section 4 shows how to construct the Boolean circuit representation from a model. Section 5 discusses
our analysis using SAT-based BMC and proposes customized decision heuristics that improve the efficiency of the analysis. In
Section 6 we present the prototype software verification tool F-Soft [40]. Section 7 introduces one of the analyzed network
protocol case studies, while Section 8 presents experimental results for various case studies using F-Soft in detail. Section 9
concludes this paper with some remarks and pointers to future work.
2. Background: Model checking
This section provides a brief overview and terminology for model checking — more details can be found in the related
book [15]. Model checking is a popular technique for checking correctness properties, in which the design to be verified is
represented as a finite state transition system, and the property is specified as a temporal logic formula. Temporal logics are
very useful for specifying dynamic behavior over time. Different variants of temporal logics have become popular, such as
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computation Tree Logic (CTL), depending on whether a linear or a branching view of time
is considered, respectively. In this paper, we focus mainly on simple safety properties, denoted in CTL as AGp. This formula
specifies that on all (A) paths of a system, globally (G) in each state of the path, the property p holds. Such properties can
be verified by an exhaustive traversal of the state-space to check that p holds in every reachable state, i.e. it is an invariant.
Alternately, safety properties can also be checked by searching for a counterexample, which shows reachability of an unsafe
state (where p is false).
Model checking can be applied directly for verification of finite state systems, such as sequential circuits and protocol
controllers. In addition, by use of suitable abstractions, finite state models can also be extracted from infinite state
systems, for subsequent verification using model checking. These applications include real-time system verification [1],
parameterized system verification [9], and software program verification [18,67]. Furthermore, model checking techniques
have also been extended to pushdown systems [5,8], i.e. systems with a finite control but with an unbounded stack. Such
systems allow a direct modeling of recursion inherent in software programs. In this paper, we will focus on techniques for
extracting finite state models from C programs, as described in detail in Section 3. These ideas also apply to extraction of
pushdown models, such as Boolean programs [5].
Explicit statemodel checkers, such as SPIN [37], use an explicit representation of states and transitions in the system, and
enumerate all reachable states explicitly. They utilize many additional techniques such as state hashing for compaction of
state representations, and partial order methods to avoid exploring all interleavings of concurrent processes. The scalability
issue in explicit state enumeration makes these checkers unsuitable for hardware designs, although they have found
practical success in verification of controllers and software.
In contrast, symbolic model checkers, such as SMV [49], avoid an explicit enumeration of the state-space by using
symbolic representations of sets of states and transitions. They typically use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [10], which
provide a canonical symbolic representation of Boolean formulas and efficient graph-based algorithms for symbolic
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manipulation. For hardware designs, where these symbolic representations effectively capture the regularity in the state-
space, symbolic model checking has significantly extended the ability to handle large state-spaces.
Despite the considerable benefits of symbolic model checking using BDDs, the basic verification approach of exhaustive
analysis does not scale well in practice. An alternative is the use of falsification approaches, such as bounded model checking
(BMC) [6], which focus primarily on the search for finding bugs. In BMC, the problem of searching for a counterexample
of length k is translated to a Boolean formula (by unrolling the transition relation of the design k times), such that the
formula is satisfiable if and only if there exists a counterexample of length k. In practice, k can be increased incrementally to
find a shortest counterexample if one exists. Additional reasoning, in the form of completeness thresholds [6] or proofs by
induction [31,63], can be combined with BMC to ensure completeness when desired.
The Boolean satisfiability (SAT) check in the BMC approach is typically performed by a back-end SAT-solver. Most
modern SAT-solvers use a DPLL-style-search-based decision procedure, with distinct methods and heuristics for making
decisions (choosing a variable and value to explore), for Boolean constraint propagation (making implications on other
variables), and for performing conflict analysis and backtracking in case a conflict is found. Due to many recent advances
in SAT-solvers [48,55], verification techniques based on SAT have become very popular (see a recent survey [56] for useful
pointers). In particular, SAT-based BMC is often successful in finding bugs in much larger hardware designs than BDD-
based approaches, and has also been used successfully for verifying C programs [16,40]. A related important development
has been the use of resolution-based proof-analysis techniques [28,72] for SAT-solvers. These techniques were developed
in order to independently check the unsatisfiability result of a SAT-solver. In addition, these techniques can also identify
a set of clauses from the original problem, called the unsatisfiable core, that are sufficient for implying unsatisfiability. The
unsatisfiable core has been used very effectively for proof-based abstraction [32,52], refinement [11], and for interpolant-
based verification [35,51]. Thesemethods allow SAT-based BMC to be combined effectivelywith other techniques to provide
complete verification methods. There has also been growing interest in the use of SAT for unbounded model checking [25,
33,50]. However, these techniques are not as robust as SAT-based BMC techniques.
3. Software modeling for C programs
Symbolic model checkers (both SAT- and BDD-based) work on a symbolic transition relation of a finite state system,
typically represented in terms of a vector of binary-valued latches and a Boolean next state function (or relation) for each
latch. For reachability properties, unsafe states can be specified quite simply as a predicate on the latches. In this section,
we describe an approach (implemented in the F-Soft tool) for translating a given C program into a finite state model whose
traces represent C program traces, and to represent this model symbolically using binary-valued latches and their transition
relations. In other words, all high-level C constructs (arrays, pointers, dynamic memory, control flow) require faithful
modeling, ultimately in terms of binary-valued latches and Boolean functions. Note that high-level synthesis systems, i.e.,
systems that synthesize RTL hardware descriptions from high-level C specifications also face this task, although they need
to handle only a subset of C sufficient for describing hardware [62,65].
3.1. Labeled transition graphs
We begin with full-fledged C and apply a series of source-to-source transformations into smaller subsets of C, until
program state is represented as a collection of simple scalar variables and each program step is represented as a set of parallel
assignments to these variables. Formally, the transformations produce a labeled transition graph (LTG) of the program. A
LTG G is a tuple 〈B, bs, E, X, I, C, A, δ, θ〉, where
• B = {b1, . . . , bn} is a finite non-empty set of basic blocks.
• bs ∈ B is the initial basic block.
• E ⊆ B× B is the set of edges. If (bi, bj) ∈ E, we say bi is a predecessor of bj, and bj is a successor of bi.
• X is a finite set of program variables.
• I contains initialization constraints on variables in X.
• C is a finite set of conditions that determines control flow of a C program. Typical sources include the conditional
expressions in if-then-else, while, for statements.
• A is a finite set of assignments.
• δ : B → 2A is a labeling function that labels each basic block with a set of parallel assignments. We denote a type-
consistent valuation of all variables in X by x, and the set of all type-consistent valuations by X. Let the set of allowed
C-expressions be denoted byΣ . Then, the parallel assignments in each basic block can bewritten as Y←e1, . . . , en, where
Y = (y1, . . . , yn), {y1, . . . , yn} ⊆ X and {e1, . . . , en} ⊆ Σ .
• θ : E→ C is a labeling function that labels each edge with a condition. For the Boolean circuit model we require that at
most one outgoing guard is satisfied at any point. Given a basic block bi, let Bi ⊂ B be the set of all successors of bi. Then
∀b, b′ ∈ Bi : b 6= b′ H⇒ θ(bi, b) ∧ θ(bi, b′) ≡ 0.
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Fig. 1. Labeled transition graph.
As a running example, Fig. 1 shows an LTG G obtained from the C program on the left side. Each rectangle is a basic block
with an associated unique number showing its index. i.e., B = {b0, . . . , b10}. The assignments inside each basic block are
obtained by applying labeling function δ. Note that a basic block can be empty (e.g. δ(b1) ≡ ∅). The edges are labeled by
conditional expressions; e.g. θ(b1, b2) ≡ x ≤ 4. When an edge is not labeled by any condition, the default condition is true.
The example pictorially shows how non-recursive function calls are included in the control flow of the calling function.
A preprocessing analysis determines that function foo is not called in any recursive manner. The two return points are
recorded by an encoding that passes a unique return location as a special parameter using the variable rtr.
3.2. Modeling of C program memory
One of the biggest difficulties in modeling C programs lies in modeling indirect memory accesses via pointers, such as
x = ∗(p+ i) or ∗(q+ j) = y. This includes array accesses, since A[e] is equivalent to ∗(A+e). We replace all indirect accesses in
the C program with expressions involving only direct variable accesses by introducing appropriate conditional expressions
on auxiliary variables as described in detail below.
Modeling the heap and stack. The C language specification does not bound heap or stack size, but our focus is on generating
a bounded model only. Therefore, we model the heap as a finite array, adding a simple implementation of malloc() that
returns pointers into this array. We also add a bounded depth stack as another global array, in order to handle bounded
recursion, if required, along with code to save and restore local state for recursive functions only. Note that in practice we
generally analyze embedded software where we generally do not observe extensive use of recursion.
Modeling pointers. We build an internal memory representation of the program by assigning to each variable a unique
number representing itsmemory address. Variables that are adjacent inC programmemory (for example, adjacent elements
of one array) are given consecutive memory addresses in our model; this facilitates the modeling of pointer arithmetic.
Pointers are modeled as integers: pointer variable p points to simple variable x by storing the integer memory address
assigned to x.
We perform a points-to analysis [36] to determine, for each indirect memory access, the set of variables that may be
accessed (called the points-to set). If we determine that pointer p can point to variables a, b, . . . , z at a given program location,
we can rewrite a pointer read ∗(p + i) as a conditional expression of the form ((p + i) == &a?a : ((p + i) == &b?b : . . .))
where &a,&b, . . . are the numeric memory addresses we assigned to the variables a, b, . . . respectively.
Inferred variables. Additional variables are introduced when pointer variables are declared. The declaration int **p;
creates three variables vp, v′p, v′′p , where vp stands for p, v′p for *p, and v′′p for **p. Similarly, the declaration int *a, *b;
creates four variables va, v′a, vb, v′b, while a dereference in the C code, such as &a, also leads to an additional variable — in this
case the variable ′va.
In our memory modeling framework we may thus have several copies of the same value although they all represent the
same location. Although this modeling approach may increase the number of variables when compared to the usual heap
model, it can lead to analysis savings. This is due to the fact that the number of live variables can often be substantially
reduced when a variable is read through a pointer dereference, because a pointer variable can point only to one location at
a time, even though its points-to set may be large. Consider the example of a pointer p that could point to any element of a
set of variables of size N. The statement *p usually requires all N elements to be live at this point, since any single element
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Fig. 2. Control logic subgraph .
may be pointed to by p. However, by adding a dedicated variable that always keeps the value of *p updated, we can reduce
the number of live variables important at this point to this single dedicated variable. This observation has been reported in
hardware synthesis frameworks [62], andwe believewe are the first to exploit it for verification purposes. Analysismethods,
such as SAT-solvers, that can exploit the effect of fewer live variables while being relatively unaffected by the increase in
problem size can thus scale better in practice.
Inferred assignments. In our memory modeling framework, additional assignments have to be inferred due to aliasing
and newly introduced variables. We distinguish between two types of additional assignments, namely assignments due to
aliasing and implied assignments. Assignments based on aliasing are due to the fact thatmultiple copies of the same location
may exist. Implied assignments are due to the fact that we explicitly model the values of the pointed to locations for pointer
variables.
As an example, consider the assignment p=&a. This directly corresponds to the assignment vp = ′va. However, since
p=&a implies *p=a and **p=*a, two new assignments v′p = va and v′′p = v′a are also inferred from the original assignment
in the source code. We call such assignments implied assignments.
An assignment a=&x gives rise not only to the assignments va = ′vx and v′a = vx, but also to conditional assignments due
to aliasing. Since pmay equal &a, it is possible that *p and **p are assigned new values when a is assigned. This results in
the conditional assignments v′p = (p == ′va)?′vx : v′p (which stands for *p=(p==&a)?&x:*p) and v′′p = (p == ′va)?vx : v′′p
(which stands for **p=(p==&a)?x:**p). These kind of assignments are called assignments due to aliasing.
4. Boolean representation
In this section we describe how to generate a Boolean transition relation from an LTG G. We define a state of a program to
be a tuple (b, x), consisting of a location b ∈ B representing the basic block, and a type-consistent valuation of data variables
x ∈ X, where out-of-scope variables at b are assigned the undefined value ⊥. We consider the initial state of the program
to be an initial location bs, where each variable in X can take any value that is type-consistent with its specification. For
checking reachability in programs, we define a set of blocks Bad ⊆ B to be unsafe, and model checking is used to prove or
disprove that these basic blocks can be reached. Formally, we define a path of length k in the state space to be a sequence
of k states (b0, x0), . . . , (bk−1, xk−1) such that b0 ≡ bs is the initial basic block and ∀0 ≤ i < k − 1 : (bi, xi ) → (bi+1, xi+1),
where→ denotes a transition between the states. A counterexample of length k is a path that ends in an unsafe location,
that is bk−1 ∈ Bad.
In order to construct a Boolean transition relation of a LTG G, we divide G into two subgraphs GC and GD, where GC captures
the control flow and GD captures the data logic.
4.1. Control logic
Given an LTG G = 〈B, bs, E, X, I, C, A, δ, θ〉, we define a control logic subgraph GC = 〈B, bs, E, X, C, θ〉. GC discards the
labeling function δ and assignment set A because it does not care how variables are updated. However, it keeps all the
labeled edges between the basic blocks in order to capture the control flow information in a C program. A program counter
(pc) variable is introduced to monitor progress in GC . For example, Fig. 2 shows the control logic subgraph for the program
shown in Fig. 1.
One contribution of this paper is to use the program counter to track progress of allowed executions of the code during
BMC. The model checking analysis is performed by understanding an unrolling to be one step in a block-wise execution of
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Fig. 3. Data logic subgraph.
the program, where each atomic step consists of a basic block rather than an individual statement. Similar approaches have
been explored in a non-BMC setting to software model checking (such as with tools like VeriSoft [27], Java PathFinder [34,
67] and Bogor [57]), which have also extended it to deal with concurrency by using partial-order reduction. However, by
incorporating this idea into a SAT-based BMC we are able to take advantage of recent progress in SAT-solvers, while also
improving its efficiency for software verification by customizing the SAT-solver heuristics.
Next we show how to extract the control logic that defines the transition relation for the pc with the edges and the
conditions guarding the transitions between the blocks in GC . If N denotes the number of basic blocks in a GC , we can use
2dlogNe bits to express the program counter. Let c1, c2, · · · cn denote the current state program counter bits, and c′1, c′2, · · · c′n
denote the next state program counter bits where n = dlogNe.
An edge Eij = (bi, bj) is enabled if and only if pc = i∧θ(bi, bj) = true. Once Eij is enabled, the next value for pc is j. i.e., pc′ = j.
GC is encoded in Table 1, where the first n columns show the bit values of current state pc variables, the next n columns show
the bit values of next state pc variables, and the last column shows the bit value of the guarding condition. The jth table line
represents an edge (vj1v
j
2 · · · vjn → vj
′
1v
j′
2 · · · vj′n) in the control flow graph with guard kj, where vji ∈ {0, 1} is an assignment to ci
and vj
′
i ∈ {0, 1} is an assignment to c′i . Based on the truth table, we build the next state logic for each program counter bit as:
c′i =
∨
j:vj′i =1
kj ∧ ∧
p:vjp=1
cp ∧
∧
p:vjp=0
¬cp
 .
Finally, the next state control logic for GC is:
pc′ ≡
n∧
i=1
c′i.
4.2. Data logic
A data logic subgraph of G is defined as GD = 〈B, X, A, δ〉. GD discards all the control flow information and concentrates on
data updates at individual blocks. Fig. 3 shows the data logic subgraph for the program shown in Fig. 1.
Assume a variable xi ∈ X is assigned in blocks bij (1 ≤ j ≤ k) by expressions exprij and not assigned in bij (k < j ≤ n). The
next state data logic for xi can be written as:
x′i =
(
k∨
j=1
(pc = index(bij)) ∧ exprij
)
∨
(
n∨
j=k+1
(pc = index(bij)) ∧ xi
)
,
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where index(b) returns the index value of block b. The next state control logic for GD is:
X′ ≡ ∧
xi∈X
x′i.
In order to obtain the binary logic for each variable assignment x′ = expr, we build a combinational circuit for expr. For
example, to handle an expression of type expr1&expr2 (bit-wise AND), we first build circuits for the sub-expressions expr1
and expr2. Let vectors vec1 and vec2 be the outputs of these circuits. The final result has the same bit-width as vec1 and vec2,
and each result bit is the output of an AND gate with two inputs being the corresponding bits in vec1 and vec2. To handle an
expression of type expr1+ expr2, we create an n-bit adder. For the case of a relational expression the result has only one bit.
5. Model analysis and customized decision heuristics
The Boolean circuit models generated by our software modeling contain many common features that are based on the
particular translation presented here. Although we model the program counter to track progress in the control flow graph,
there is additional information in the original program that could improve the efficiency of the SAT-based BMC. Although
each unrolling introduces the whole code into the satisfiability problem, many blocks in the new unrolling can be declared
unreachable bymerely considering the control flow of the software program. In the following, we propose various heuristics
that improve the performance of the SAT-based BMC for the Booleanmodels generated from software programs. In Section 8,
we show the effectiveness of these heuristics in our experiments.
5.1. Decision scoring of PC variables
We adjust the decision heuristics used by the SAT-solver in our VeriSol verification engine to take advantage of the fact
that we are analyzing a Boolean circuit model generated from a software program. A simple decision heuristic that increases
the likelihood that the SAT-solver makes decisions first on variables that correspond to the control flow rather than the data
flow, takes advantage of the fact that each new unrolling does not allow the whole code to be reached.
We implement this heuristic by increasing the score for the bits of the program counter variable, which in turnmakes the
back-end SAT-solver choose these variables as decision variables first. In addition to scoring program counter variable bits
higher than other variables in the system, we also control how to vary the scoring of these bits over various time-frames.
For example, variables in later time-frames can be scored higher than those in the earlier time-frames.
5.2. One-hot encoding of basic blocks using selection bits
Another heuristic that we implemented is a one-hot encoding of the pc variables which allows the SAT-solver to make
decisions on the full program counter variable instead of the individual bits of the program counter. In addition to the
binary encoded program counter variable already present in the circuit, we add a new selection bit for each basic block. The
selection bit is set iff the basic block is active, i.e. when a certain combination of program counter variable bits is valid. This
provides a mechanism for word-level decisions. Furthermore, it increases the efficiency of the SAT solver, since a certain
basic block selection bit automatically invalidates all other selection bits through the program counter variable bits.
By increasing the score of the selection bits in comparison to other variables in the system, we are able to influence the
SAT-solver to make quick decisions on the location first. An obvious disadvantage to this heuristic is that we need to add
one selection bit to the Boolean circuit model per basic block in the software code. However, in practice this disadvantage
is mitigated by the performance improvements as described in Section 8.
In addition, we can increase the score for these basic block selection bits by considering the pre-computed static
reachability information from the CFG. We increase the score for only those basic block selection bits at depth k, if the
corresponding basic block can actually be reached statically in the CFG at depth k. This requires an additional BFS of reachable
basic blocks at various depths in the CFG.
As an example, let bi represent the selection bit for basic block i and let ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 represent the four needed program
counter variable bits for the code shown in Fig. 1. We add constraints for each basic block, asserting the equality of the
block selection variable with the binary-encoded program counter label. For example, b0 = c¯3c¯2c¯1c¯0 and b6 = c¯3c2c1c¯0.
Now, a decision by the SAT-solver to assign b0 to 1 corresponds to a word-level decision on the program counter, which
immediately results in implying bi = 0, i > 0, including b6 = 0 in our example.
Furthermore, similar to the previously described technique of scoring variables in later time-frames higher than in prior
time-frames, we can also use this strategy for scoring of the selection bits.
5.3. Explicit modeling of incoming CFG transitions
We can also aid the analysis of the back-end SAT-solver by constraining its search space to eliminate impossible
predecessor–successor basic block combinations in the CFG. These constraints capture additional high-level information,
which helps to prune the search space of the SAT-solver. At each depth, the choice by the SAT-solver to consider a particular
basic block enables a limited number of possible predecessor blocks and eliminates immediately all other basic blocks from
consideration.
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Fig. 4. F-Soft tool overview.
By increasing the likelihood that the SAT-solver decides first on the program counter, we take advantage of the fact that
each new unrolling does not allow all basic blocks to be reachable at each depth. We prefer to add these constraints based
on incoming transitions into a basic block, since the Booleanmodel of the software already encodes the outgoing transitions
in terms of the program counter variable. This helps the SAT-solver since it provides bi-directional information about the
transitions in the CFG.
For example, let c′i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, denote the next state program counter variable bits in Fig. 1. The following constraint
is added for basic block 7: c¯′3c′2c′1c′0 → (c¯3c¯2c1c0 ∨ c¯3c2c¯1c¯0), to reflect the constraint that if the current block is 7, then the
predecessor block is either 3 or 4. Similarly, for basic block 3, we add the following constraint: c¯′3c¯′2c′1c′0 → (c¯3c¯2c¯1c0 ∧ g),
where g stands for the representation of x>4. We can also add such constraints in terms of the one-hot encoded selection
bits for the basic blocks if both these heuristics are being utilized. The constraint for basic block 7 then simply becomes
b′7 → (b3 ∨ b4).
We also allow the user to customize this heuristic by choosing a subset of basic blocks for which to apply this heuristic.
This customization allows the user to fine-tune the amount of additional constraints generated, since too many additional
constraints may burden the SAT-solver rather than improve performance.
In addition, another optimization, that we have not yet implemented, is to limit the additional constraints at each depth
to those basic blocks that are actually reachable at that depth. This optimization, similar to the optimization described in
the one-hot encoding heuristic, requires an additional BFS of reachable basic blocks.
6. Tool overview
In this section we describe our verification tool F-Soft [40]. Its novelty lies in the combination of several recent advances
in formal methods research including SAT-based verification, static program analyses and predicate abstraction. As shown
in Fig. 4, we translate a program into a Boolean representation to be analyzed by our verification engine VeriSol (based on
DiVer) [26] which includes BDD- and SAT-based model checking techniques. In addition to these standard model checking
techniques, it also contains specialized model checking engines that are targeted for software models. These include use of
disjunctive BDDs [69], and use of multiple symbolic representations using a combination of decision procedures for Boolean
and integer representations [70].
The tools also includes various static program analyses, such as computing the control flow graph of the program,
performing program slicingwith respect to the property and performing range analysis as briefly described in the following.
Wemodel the software using a Boolean circuit representation, including customized heuristics for analysis by a SAT-solver,
as described earlier in Section 5.We perform a localized predicate abstractionwith register sharingwith support of statically
computed numeric invariants, if the user so chooses.
The actual analysis of the resulting Boolean circuit model is then performed using the VeriSol tool. If a counterexample
is discovered, we use a testbench generator that outputs an executable program for the user to analyze the bug in his/her
favorite debugger. In the following, we briefly describe various stages of the F-Soft tool.
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6.1. Static program analysis
As mentioned before, F-Soft relies on a variety of static program analysis steps to reduce the model of the program and
number of properties as much as possible before model checking is performed on the remaining model and properties. We
briefly touch upon a few of the novel techniques that are employed in F-Soft.
Range Analysis. Since model checking suffers from the state explosion problemwhich is further exacerbated in the context
of software verification, we introduce the use of lightweight, efficient and sound abstraction techniques to statically
determine possible ranges for values of program variables. Such range information for each variable can be used to improve
the efficiency of software verification tools by providing a smaller state-space to be considered by the back-end model
checking engines such as those based on BDDs or SAT-solvers.
In addition, range information can be used to reduce the size of bit-blasted verification models to which programs are
translated for verification purposes: a 3-bit adder can be expressed with fewer Boolean operators than a 32-bit adder.
Furthermore, such range information can be used to improve the efficiency of other popular techniques such as predicate
abstraction and counterexample-guided abstraction refinement as described in [71]. Although range analysis techniques
have been used for other applications [58], we believe we are the first to use them for software model checking.
Invariant analysis using numeric domains.Numerical domain static analysis has been used to prove safety of programs for
properties such as the absence of buffer overflows, null pointer dereferences, division by zero, string usage and floating point
errors [7,23,68]. Domains such as ranges (or intervals), octagons, and polyhedra are used to symbolically over-approximate
the set of possible values of integer and real-valued program variables along with their relationships under the abstract
interpretation framework [12,19,21,29,43,53,59]. These domains are classified by their precision, i.e, their ability to represent
sets of states, and tractability, the complexity of common operations such as union (join), post-condition, widening and so
on. In general, enhanced precision leads to more proofs and less false positives, while resulting in a costlier analysis.
Fortunately, applications require a domain that is “precise enough” rather than “most precise”. As a result, research in
static analysis has resulted in numerous trade-offs between precision and tractability. The octagon abstract domain, for
instance, uses polyhedra with two variables per constraint and unit coefficients [53]. The restriction yields fast, polynomial
time domain operations. Simultaneously, the pair-wise comparisons captured by octagons also express and prove many
common run time safety issues in practical software [7]. Nevertheless, a drawback of the octagon domain is its inability to
reason with properties that may need constraints of a more complex form. We have incorporated various inter-procedural
invariant analysis engines into the F-Soft tool that are based on disjunctive analysis [61] and a new numeric domain called
symbolic range domain [60].
6.2. Predicate abstraction
Predicate abstraction is a popular technique for extracting finite state models from software [4]. The application of
predicate abstraction to large programs depends crucially on the choice and usage of the predicates. If all predicates are
tracked globally in the program, the analysis often becomes intractable due to too many predicate relationships.
Our contribution [41] is inspired by the lazy abstraction approach and the localization techniques implemented in BLAST
[35]. BLAST makes use of interpolation, whereas we use weakest pre-conditions to find predicates relevant at each program
location. While weakest pre-conditions have been used for predicate abstraction techniques before, we are the first to use
them to find predicates in a localized (block-based) fashion.
The performance of BDD-based model checkers depends crucially on the number of state variables. Due to predicate
localization most predicates are useful only in certain parts of the program. The state variables corresponding to these
predicates can be shared to represent different predicates in other parts of the abstraction. However, this might result in
too many abstraction refinement iterations; e.g., if the value of a certain predicate needs to be tracked at multiple program
locations. Sincewe add predicates lazily only along infeasible traces, the fact that a predicate is globally usefulwill be learned
only through multiple abstraction refinement iterations. We make use of a simple heuristic for deciding when the value of
a certain predicate may need to be tracked globally or in a complete functional scope. If the value of a predicate needs to
be tracked in a large scope, then it is assigned a dedicated state variable which is not reused for representing the value of
other predicates in the same scope. More details on our localized predicate abstraction approach using register sharing can
be found in [41].
We further improve the predicate abstraction refinement loop through the use of a priori statically computed invariants.
Themain idea is to selectively strengthen (conjoin) the concrete transition relation at a given program location by efficiently
computed invariants that hold at that program location. We observe that the abstract models produced by predicate
abstraction of strengthened transition relation aremore precise leading to fewer spurious counterexamples, thus, decreasing
the total number of abstraction refinement iterations. Furthermore, the length of relevant fragments of spurious traces
needing refinement shortens. This leads to an addition of fewer predicates for refinement. Additional details on the use of
invariants for predicate abstraction can be found in [42].
6.3. Testbench generation and debugging
The back-end verification in F-Soft is performed by the VeriSol tool. If VeriSol discovers a real counterexample, F-Soft
reports to the user a descriptive one-line summary of the bug. For example, consider the source code for functionpointer2
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Fig. 5. F-Soft testbench generator for gdb in emacs.
in the lower half of Fig. 5. In this example, F-Soft performed the check for the use of uninitialized variables. Here, F-Soft
reports that a bug was found in file test.c at line 48: At least one variable not initialized in a condition.
In addition to the bug summary, F-Soft generates an error trace on the original source code, to help the user in debugging.
This error trace is also utilized by an automatic testbench generator, which generates an executable program for the user
to analyze the bug in more detail in his/her favorite debugger. Fig. 5 shows this capability using the emacs front-end to
the commonly used gdb debugger. In effect, the F-Soft testbench executable initializes the memory state according to the
discovered counterexample, and automatically sets breakpoints in the source code at places that are deemed interesting for
demonstrating the bug. Furthermore, F-Soft adds descriptive messages into the output of gdb, thus improving the users’
understanding of the bug. More importantly, the testbench allows the user to debug in a familiar environment, utilizing all
features provided by standard debuggers, such as inspection of data, setting of breakpoints etc. The output in the upper half
of Fig. 5 shows a sample execution of our generated testbench. Note that external variables and parameters (here: parameter
x) are initialized according to the discovered bug, and breakpoints are automatically set at the entry to the main function
for analysis purposes pointer2 and near the line where the bug occurs. Note also the use of data inspections using gdb’s
p (display) command, and tracing using the n (next) command.
7. Network case study: Point-to-point protocol
The verification of various network protocols has been a popular application of model checkers [24]. Most of these
approaches have analyzed models of network protocols with respect to some temporal properties such as absence of
deadlock where the model is based on a textbook description or an RFC (Request for Comments) document. Recently, there
have also been attempts to verify an implementation of a protocol with respect to its standard defined in an RFC [3]. In this
section, we describe the Point-to-Point protocol, which is one of the case studies for F-Soft.
The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) provides a standard method for transporting multi-protocol datagrams over point-
to-point links. PPP contains three main components, namely a method for encapsulating multi-protocol datagrams, a Link
Control Protocol (LCP) for establishing, configuring, and testing the data-link connection, and a family of Network Control
Protocols (NCPs) for establishing and configuring different network-layer protocols. Similar to [3], we focus on checking the
implementation of the option negotiation automaton of the LCP part of PPP for link establishment.
RFC 1661 [64] specifies the complete state transition table of the automaton. It is a finite state machine with 10 states,
which reacts to 15 events. The automaton can switch states when receiving an event, and also perform other actions, such
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Table 2
A part of the PPP specification
Stopped Req-Sent Opened
Close Term-Req Term-Req
goto Closed goto Closing goto Closing
RCA Term-Ack
goto Ack-Rcvd goto Req-Sent
RTR Term-Ack Term-Ack Term-Ack
goto Stopping
RTA Conf-Req
goto Req-Sent
Fig. 6. PPP verification setup.
as sending replies. Any implementation of the PPP has to follow the behavior described in the RFC, which is partly shown in
Table 2 for the states Stopped, Req-Sent and Opened. We only present the information about which messages should
be sent back, if any, and what the next state should be if there is a change of states. An empty field describes the fact that
the automaton will simply ignore a received packet.
We consider an open-source implementation of the protocol (ppp-2.4.0) distributed in various Linux systems. In this
paper we assume that events and actions are handled correctly by the implementation. The following represents a code
fragment of the public implementation:
static void fsm_rtermack(f)
fsm *f;
{
switch (f->state) {
/*NOTE: other cases removed for brevity*/
case OPENED:
if (f->callbacks->down) /*Inform upper layers*/
(*f->callbacks->down)(f);
fsm_sconfreq(f, 0);
break;
}
}
For the purpose of this paper, we edit the public implementation to be limited to LCP. We want to verify that the
public implementation adheres to the specification as given in RFC 1661. The prototype implementation did not support
verification ofmulti-threaded code at the time of these experiments [39].We implemented the following scheme to analyze
the implementation of PPPwhich is illustrated in Fig. 6: To check the public implementationweneed a second peer to engage
it.We developed an environment peer based on the RFC inC, that also initiates requests non-deterministically. Since our goal
is to analyze whether the public implementation adheres fully to the RFC specification, we also implemented a specification
model of the RFC in C.
The environment and the public implementation are engaged in communication, while the specification “listens in” on
messages received by the public implementation. Although the specification tries to respond to thesemessages, its outgoing
link is “grounded” and does not affect the environment peer. Our analysis thus translates to the question whether the state
of the public implementation always matches the state of the RFC-based specification starting from such safe and correct
states.
In [3], the C-program as described here, has been manually translated to the input language of the model checker
Mocha[2]. In contrast to that approach, we actually perform model checking based on a slightly modified original source
code after providing an appropriate environment for the property at hand. The analysis in [3] shows that the public
implementation does not fully adhere to the specification given by RFC 1661. When the peer receives a packet RTA, it is
supposed to send back a configuration request, which is implemented correctly in the public implementation. However, it
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Table 3
Experimental results
Latches Gates In std sc 1h tr sc&1h sc&tr 1h&tr All
W1 62/1314 22k–24k 360 TO TO 1052 TO 1035 TO 1048 1040
W2 68/1311 20k–28k 30 TO TO 302 TO 300 TO 302 300
W3 209/1114 14k–19k 30 5706 5537 2240 TO 2235 5619 2189 2240
W4 406/709 5210–6426 0 TO TO 1463 TO 1485 TO 1462 1460
W5 444/747 5731–7250 0 TO TO 2933 6511 2935 7448 2930 2946
P1 18/50 459–621 6 1714 1692 1678 1198 1688 1043 1694 1747
P2 18/50 459–621 6 4087 5228 8289 3442 8856 4006 6903 6988
P3 55/123 785–1065 15 194 205 255 197 255 215 255 255
is also supposed to update its internal state toReq-Sent, which ismissing in the implementation.Wepresent experimental
results for this case study in more detail in the following section.
8. Experimental results
We have performed various case studies comparing the customized decision heuristics using F-Soft. In the following we
describe the results of multiple case studies that we have recently completed. In most experiments we assume a 4 h time
limit for the analysis. For the first five case studies named W1–W5 the analysis finds that the stated property is incorrect
and a witness trace exists, while for the later three case studies named P1–P3 the analysis finds a proof for the property.
We summarize the experimental results in Table 3. W3 is the PPP network protocol case study described in Section 7,
while W1 and W2 are related pieces of code with different complexities. The designs W4 and W5 are based on a different
example — they have the same source code but consider different properties. The code forW4 andW5 is relatively small and
is purely straight-line codewith no loops. The provable case studies P1 and P2 are based on a simple reactive and interleaved
mutual exclusion example where we use different proof strategies to derive the correctness proof. P3 is an unrelated simple
code fragment based on interface specification checking.
8.1. Results for customized heuristics used in BMC
For each case study, Table 3 shows the number of latches in the Boolean circuit representation in the second column.We
include two numbers, where the first number corresponds to the number of latches where the one-hot encoding heuristic
is not used, while the second number represents the number of latches with one-hot encoding. Please note that we uses
the range analysis techniques [58,71] to limit the number of bits per variable. We also compute the cone of influence of the
circuit model with respect to the property which further reduces the number of latches in the model.
The next column labeled gates contains the number of gates in the Boolean circuit models for these case studies, where
the range depends on the subset of heuristics used for the various verification runs. The lower bound corresponds to the case
that no customized heuristics are used, while the upper bound represents the number of gates in the case that all heuristics
are used. The following column labeled in denotes the number of primary inputs needed for the analysis of the respective
property.
The following columns represent the experimental results with respect to CPU time measured in seconds for our BMC
analyses using the various combinations of heuristics. The column labeled std represents the case when we use standard
VeriSol without any of the customized heuristics described here. It can be seen that the standard VeriSol implementation
is not able to complete the analysis of four of the eight models due to a time-out, denoted TO, where the 4 h time-limit
expires.
The remaining columns show the experimental results for various combinations of heuristics used for the analysis. We
abbreviate the heuristics scoring of pc variables by sc, one-hot encoding by 1h and explicit modeling of CFG transitions by tr. For
example, the column 1h&tr corresponds to the combination of one-hot encoding and explicit modeling of CFG transitions,
while all includes additionally the scoring of pc variables.
The data show that using just the one-hot encoding heuristic proves very efficient for the analysis of models W1–W5
when compared to the standard VeriSol heuristics, while the respective results for models P1–P3 are somewhat mixed.
Using the scoring pc variables heuristic by itself, on the other hand, does not seem to benefit our analysis in this set
of experiments. In contrast to the one-hot encoding heuristic, it is interesting to note that the explicit modeling of CFG
transitions seems to be helpful in models P1–P3, while ineffective for models W1–W5 when used individually.
When considering the possible combinations of heuristics, it is worth noting that for models W1–W5 the advantage
of using the one-hot encoding is supported by the addition of other heuristics. A similar statement can however not be
made for the provable models P1–P3 where the results are currently inconclusive with respect to the best combination
of heuristics. For P1 we find that using scoring of pc variables with explicit modeling of CFG transitions improves the
performance somewhat over the case that only the explicit modeling of transitions is used.
In summary, we find that in most cases a combination of one-hot encoding of basic blocks with explicit modeling of
incoming transitions is a good default choice when the BMC searches for both a proof and a witness. When using BMC
purely to find bugs, using one-hot encoding only seems quite effective.
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Fig. 7. Model size comparison of BMC heuristics for standard property checkers.
8.2. Customized BMC heuristics for standard property checkers
We have also performed experiments with the customized BMC heuristics for a proprietary software package, where
we analyzed the source code for various standard property violations using the F-Soft tool [38]. We analyzed the source
code for array bound violations, use of uninitialized variables, and certain locking rules violations. In total, we analyzed 177
distinct, non-trivial cases.1 The code contains over 9400 lines of C code after some preprocessing steps. The experimental
results are summarized in Figs. 7 and 8.
First consider Fig. 7, which presents a comparison of the generated models for the various checks with and without the
one-hot encoding heuristics discussed in Section 5. The figure contains a scatter plot on a logarithmic scale of the number
of registers required with and without the one-hot encoding of basic blocks (+), and the corresponding number of Boolean
connectives (×). As expected, all data points are at or below the diagonal, which means that in all cases one-hot encoding
introduces additional registers and additional Boolean connectives. More interestingly, it can be seen graphically that the
number of registers using one-hot encoding can substantially increase the complexity of the model, while the number of
Boolean connectives remains relatively unaffected. In these experiments, we found a tripling of the number of required
registers, but only 32% additional Boolean connectives on average.
Consider now Fig. 8, which shows the comparison of the actual verification run-time (in seconds) observed on themodels
shown in Fig. 7, on a logarithmic scale. Any point below the diagonal corresponds to a case where the verification was faster
without the additional one-hot constraints, while points above the diagonal denote cases where the additional constraints
improved the run-time. Note that time-outs are denoted as 6000 s of run-time in the scatter plot.
As can be seen, there are many cases where the additional constraints are not useful, and the standard model was able
to complete the analysis in slightly less time. On average, for cases that were completed by both methods, we were able to
see a 3% increase in run-time by adding the one-hot constraints. Note that this increase is relatively small compared to the
increase in the model sizes shown in Fig. 7. We believe that this is largely due to the SAT-solver heuristics which allow the
SAT search to focus on relevant variables without getting unduly affected by the total number of state variables. It should
also be noted that as verification complexity increased (asmeasured by longer run-times), the one-hot encodedmodelswere
increasingly outperforming themodels generatedwithout the additional constraints. In particular, we found three cases out
of the 177 non-trivial checks that timed out using the standard model, while we were able to complete their analysis using
the additional one-hot encoding.
If we divide the cases into two groups that correspond to the cases above the diagonal and below the diagonal we further
see the improvements gained by one-hot encoding for harder cases. In cases where the standard model outperformed the
one-hot encoded model we found that it took about 10.34 s for the standard model and 13.95 s for the one-hot encoded
models, which corresponds to a run-time penalty of around 35%. We believe that for most of these cases the standard
properties were relatively easy to analyze. On the other hand, for models that were analyzed faster using one-hot encoding
and were completed by both methods, we found that the average time was 40.74 s for one-hot encoded models, but 65.06 s
for standard models, which corresponds to a 60% faster performance with one-hot encoded models. Furthermore, it should
be emphasized again that verification for three models was completed with one-hot encoding but could not be completed
within the time bound using the standard models.
1 By non-trivial cases we mean that the respective property monitors were statically able to fire a violation in the control flow graph of the considered
program piece.
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Fig. 8. Run-time comparison of BMC heuristics for standard property checkers.
8.3. Results using BDDs
In addition to the results presented in Table 3,we have also used our standard BDD-basedmodel checker on the generated
models. For designsW1,W2,W4 andW5 our BDD-basedmodel checker was able to find a witness trace, albeit being slower
than BMC and taking up to four times the amount of CPU time. In the case of W3 (the PPP case study), the BDD-based model
checker was not able to complete the analysis in the given time-bound.
For designs P1–P3, the BDD-based model checker beat any of the BMC-based analyses given in Table 3 due to the small
model sizes. It should also be noted that we have been able to improve upon the BDD engines used in these experiments by
performing a disjunctive image computation utilizing the basic block information even for BDD-based solvers [69]. However,
our experience in hardware verification suggests that SAT-based proof techniques become increasingly important compared
to BDDs when considering larger provable models. Our current results provide preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of
our customized SAT heuristics.
8.4. Basic blocks vs. individual statements
We have also performed experiments to compare our software modeling framework using basic blocks to an analysis
based on individual statements, as used in CBMC. Even for a small example (W4), we found that a BMC analysis using the
one-hot encoding heuristic took about 25% more time for the statement analysis than our implementation that uses basic
blocks. The length of the witness trace increased from 151 to 187, which corresponds to an increase of 24%. Therefore, the
final SAT problem size generated by the BMC unrolling for the case of individual statements increased by about 27%. This is
due to the fact that we have a 24% increase of the witness length, where each individual unrolling is about 11% larger than
that of basic blocks. We believe that our approach using basic blocks will be even more effective for larger case studies.
We performed additional related experiments on a variety of benchmarks checking for array bound violations, NULL
pointer dereferencing and C string librarymisuse.We show the advantage of performing additional parallelization of the CFG
after various static programsimplifications have performedmanipulations of the CFG. These simplifications include amongst
other things program slicing, constant propagation, and invariant analysis using numerical domains [60,61]. After these CFG
manipulations, we can merge basic blocks by performing additional parallelization steps. This merging step compresses an
uninterrupted sequence of basic blocks into a single basic block thus potentially shortening path lengths as well as avoiding
intermediate temporary variables.
We present experimental results of the post-simplification merging of basic blocks in Table 4. The table includes several
benchmarks,wherewe checked a variety of properties formultiple API-level entry points per benchmark.We report the sum
over all API-level entry points in the table. For each benchmarkwe report the relevant LOC, and the total number of properties
that is being analyzed by the tool for the various API-level entry points. Note that the number of properties depends both
on the size of the code and the type of check that is being performed. Then, we report the statistics for the flow where
the simplifications are performed, but no additional merging of basic blocks is happening after these simplifications. We
provide the information on how many variables (Vars) are still left in the final model that is given to the model checker,
as well as how many basic blocks (Blks) remain in that model. We also describe how many proofs (Prf) are reported by
our tool (which includes both proofs by static analysis and proofs by the model checker), as well as how many witnesses
(Wit) are discovered, and how many properties have not been resolved due to time-outs (T/O). Finally, we report the same
information for the post-simplification-merging-based approach running with the same time-out.
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Fig. 9. Cumulative time comparison of BMC heuristics for design W3.
Table 4
Experimental results on post-simplification merging
LOC Properties Without merging Merging blocks
Vars Blks Prf Wit T/O Vars Blks Prf Wit T/O
D1 8.3k 628 957 1723 249 11 368 663 1198 268 25 335
D2 5.9k 350 445 718 247 54 49 368 521 245 65 40
D3 5.5k 173 295 557 128 37 8 237 372 128 37 8
D4 7.7k 116 538 750 96 11 9 401 391 104 11 1
D5 15.4k 1005 726 1776 1000 3 2 563 1224 1001 3 1
D6 28.4k 39 2269 1048 35 4 0 2262 739 35 4 0
D7 21.4k 961 2300 1876 768 83 110 2064 1128 771 86 104
D8 21.5k 484 1132 1565 387 55 42 953 886 393 55 36
Total 114k 3756 8662 10013 2910 258 588 7511 6459 2945 286 525
As can be seen in Table 4, we are able to increase the number of found witnesses by 11% by using post-simplification
merging. We also increase the number of proofs slightly,2 and therefore decrease the number of properties with unknown
answer by 11%. These gains are partly explained by the decrease in the final model size that is passed to the model checker,
which contains about 13% less variables, and 35% less basic blocks.
8.5. Detailed results for PPP
Figs. 9 and 10 show a more detailed comparison of the individual heuristics and their performance for the PPP case
study (W3). Fig. 9 shows the cumulative time in seconds taken for all depths up to a given number, while Fig. 10 shows the
respective time needed for a particular depth.
The graphs labeled standard represent the standard decision heuristics implemented in theVeriSol tool. The graph shows
the advantage of using a SAT-based BMC for the analysis, since the standard includes various peaks in the computation
time, in particular for depths 20–35, but better performance afterwards. This indicates that the SAT-solver is able to learn
important invariants of the design early on that enable a deeper analysis later.
The figures also include three more graphs each, describing the respective performance of BMC using the heuristics
scoring of pc variables (score), one-hot encoding (one-hot) and encoding of CFG transitions (trans) individually. It is worth
noting that the inherent learning in the SAT-solver is preserved, which is visible by the various peaks in the respective
graphs. Fig. 9, in particular, shows the advantage of the one-hot encoding heuristic for the design W3 which consistently
outperforms the other heuristics.
9. Conclusions and future work
This paper describes the customized SAT-based heuristics we have used for efficient analysis of models generated
by our software verification methodology. This methodology is founded upon basic block software modeling, translating
a C program into a Boolean representation. The resulting model is analyzed by a back-end SAT-based or BDD-based
2 It should be noted that we increased the number of proofs found during the model checking stage by 17%.
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Fig. 10. Time-per-depth comparison of BMC heuristics for design W3.
bounded or unbounded model checker. It is applicable for a large subset of the C programming language allowing pointer
arithmetic and bounded recursion. We consider reachability properties, in particular whether certain assertions or basic
blocks are reachable in the source code, or whether certain standard property violations can occur. This paper also described
the implementation of these as part of our F-Soft tool [40]. We also presented detailed experimental results using our
customized heuristics for various case studies.
There remain many research directions to follow in the future. We need to experiment with the heuristics presented in
this paper more and apply them on larger case studies as well. Additional larger case studies may point us to consider other
heuristics in the SAT solver also.Wewant to further investigate the potential synergies between static program analysis and
softwaremodel checking. Furthermore,we are continuing our efforts in improving the efficiency of our predicate abstraction
implementation.
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